The Military Status of the Islands of Eastern Aegean Sea

Ιnternational Law and relevant Treaties define, in a clear way and beyond any doubt, the military status of the islands of the Aegean Sea, which can be summarised as follows:

Turkey claims that by virtue of International Treaties the Greek islands of the Eastern Aegean must remain demilitarized, deliberately omitting any reference to the fact that the status of the above-mentioned islands is not uniform and is regulated by different international agreements: The Lausanne Convention on the Straits (1923) - which was replaced by the Montreux Convention of 1936 (for the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace), the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 (for the islands of Lesvos (Mytilene), Chios, Samos and Ikaria), and the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 (for the Dodecanese islands).

1. The islands of the North-Eastern Aegean.

a) Lemnos and Samothrace: Their status bound to the status of the Straits.

The demilitarization of the Greek islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, together with the demilitarization of the zones of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and Bosporus, as well as of the Turkish Islands of Imvros (Gokceada), Tenedos (Bozcaada) and Rabbit (Tavcan), was provided for in the Lausanne Convention of 1923 on the Straits. However, this regime was totally abolished when this Convention was replaced, in its entirety, as is clearly mentioned in its preamble, by the Montreux Convention of 1936 .

Moreover, the proceedings of the preparatory work for the Montreux Convention prove, beyond any doubt, that the contracting parties to this Convention intended to replace the Lausanne Convention on the Straits in its entirety.

We should also underline that the wish of Greece to militarise Lemnos and Samothrace was accepted by a letter dated 6 May, 1936, addressed to the Greek Prime Minister from the Turkish Ambassador to Athens, Roussen Esref, upon instructions from his Government (see Annex No. 1). The Turkish Government reiterated this stand when the then Turkish Foreign Minister, Rustu Aras, while addressing the Turkish National Assembly at the time of the ratification of the Montreux Convention, explicitly recognised the legal right of Greece to base troops on Lemnos and Samothrace, stating the following: "Provisions concerning the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, which belong to our neighbouring and friendly country Greece and which were demilitarized in conformity with the convention of Lausanne of 1923 are also cancelled by the new Montreux Convention and we are very pleased for this" (Journal of the Proceedings of the Turkish National Assembly, Volume 12. July 31. 1936, p. 309 ) {see Annex No 2, the Turkish text}. Assurances of an equal value were given, during the same period, by the Turkish side to Interested Governments of Third Countries.

Finally, the Note by the Six Powers, dated 13 February, 1914, acknowledges the return of the Aegean islands to Greece, without linking it to any condition. Subsequently, the provisions of Article 12 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, dealing only with sovereignty and nothing else, reaffirm and finalise the decision of the Conference of London of 13 February, 1914, concerning Greek sovereignty over the islands of the eastern Aegean "Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty ".

On the other hand, the special provisions concerning some military restrictions (not demilitarization) on the four islands of the eastern Aegean (Lesvos {Mytilene}, Chios, Samos and Ikaria) are included in this Treaty in a separate Article (Art. 13).


b) The status of the islands of Lesvos (Mytilene), Chios, Samos and Ikaria.

With regard to the islands of Lesvos (Mytilene), Chios, Samos and Ikaria, it should be stressed that nowhere in the Lausanne Peace Treaty is it stated that these islands are under a status of demilitarization.

The Greek Government is only expected, by virtue of Article 13 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty , not to establish naval bases or fortifications there. According to this Article:

"With a view to ensuring the maintenance of peace, the Greek Government undertakes to observe the following restrictions in the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria:

1. No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said islands.
2. Greek military aircraft will be forbidden to fly over the territory of the Anatolian coast. ' Reciprocally, the Turkish Government will forbid their military aircraft to fly over the said islands.
3. The Greek military forces in the said islands will be limited to the normal contingent called up for military service, which can be trained on the spot, as well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in proportion to the force of gendarmerie and police existing in the whole of the Greek territory."

Greece abides by these provisions strictly, while the Turkish Government, also expected, by virtue of the same article, not to permit its military aircraft to overfly the airspace of the said Greek Islands, has repeatedly violated its legal obligation in this respect.

On the other hand, the same article allows Greece to maintain the presence of a small contingent for military service, which can be trained on the spot, as well as forces of gendarmerie and police.

Last but not least, Greece, like any other country in the world, has never waived its natural right of self-defense in the event her islands or any other part of her territory are threatened, in compliance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter :

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual of collective self-defence... "

In this connection, it is also relevant to mention Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, according which:
"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail ."

Thus, Greece would be failing in its obligations regarding the maintenance of international peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean if it omitted to take some precautionary defensive measures on the islands, aimed exclusively at the protection of her security and her territorial integrity, while there is ample evidence that, during recent decades, Turkey has acted in a manner inconsistent with and in violation of the U.N. Charter:

• Turkey, in violation of the Treaty of Guarantee concerning Cyprus, to which Greece is a party, invaded the Island in 1974 and, despite the numerous resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, continues to maintain a large military force on the occupied territory, which constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
• Turkey has repeatedly violated the Greek air space, and specifically the air space of the Greek islands that Turkey is under contractual obligation to respect (para. 2 of Article 13 of the Lausanne Treaty).
• However, the most serious reason of all is that, during the three last decades, Turkey has embarked upon a huge concentration of troops, arms, equipment, helicopters and landing craft in areas and points on the coast of Asia Minor, situated opposite the Greek islands and directed against the Greek Islands, since there is no other possible target in the region.

Namely, the 4th Turkish Army, (also known as the Aegean Army), created in July 1975 and based in Izmir, proves to be of an exclusively aggressive character in its deployment and training. Apart from two infantry brigades based in Izmir and several units from the Army Corps based in Bosphorus, the 4th Army, which is strictly under national control (totally exempt from NATO planning), has under its command almost the entire special forces of the Turkish Army and the landing vessels of the Turkish Navy. It is worth mentioning that the 11th Army Corps, based in Northern Cyprus - which has been occupied since 1974 - also falls under the command of the Aegean Army.

At the same time, the naval base in Aksaz (south of Izmir) harbours half of the entire Turkish Navy, while the naval base of Golcuk, severely damaged by the earthquakes of last year, was transferred to Izmir and was recently inaugurated.

The aforementioned state of affairs created by Turkey, if combined with Turkey's open threats of casus belli and direct territorial claims in the Aegean, compels and entitles Greece to take all necessary defensive measures to protect the Greek Islands. At the same time, it offers evidence of a fundamental change of circumstances from those prevailing at the time of the conclusion of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, as provided for by Art. 62 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties.

2. The status of the South-Eastern Aegean islands of the Dodecanese

As far as the Dodecanese islands are concerned, they were ceded to Greece "in full sovereignty", by virtue of the Paris Peace Treaty between Italy and the Allies, in April 1947. It is true that this Treaty provides for the demilitarization of these islands. "These islands shall be and shall remain demilitarized ". However, three important factors should be kept in mind:

• The fact that Turkey is not a contracting party to this Treaty, which, therefore, constitutes a "res inter alios acta" for it (according to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that "A Treaty does not create obligations or rights to third countries").
• The fact that this demilitarization regime was imposed upon the rest of the signatories by the Soviet Union and reflects the political considerations of Moscow at the specific time, and
• The fact that what has been mentioned above, concerning the Greek right to defense, is also mutatis mutandis applicable here.

Finally, it should also be mentioned that the whole notion of demilitarization lost its ground after the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as it was incompatible with participation in military alliances. Thus demilitarization ceased to apply on the Italian Islands, Pantelaria, Lampedusa, Lampione and Linosa and in Western Germany on the one hand, as well as in Bulgaria, Romania, Eastern Germany, Hungary and Finland on the other. It is hard to believe that, at this late date of general detente, Turkey should invoke unilateral demilitarization within the NATO Alliance.

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Τουρκική αξίωση για αποστρατικοποίηση των νήσων του Ανατολικού Αιγαίου

Η Τουρκία είναι η μόνη χώρα που ζητά την αποστρατικοποίηση συλλήβδην των "νήσων του Ανατολικού Αιγαίου", χωρίς καμία διάκριση, σκοπίμως παραβλέποντας ότι τα ελληνικά αυτά νησιά διέπονται από διαφορετικά καθεστώτα όσον αφορά τους εξοπλισμούς. Ειδικότερα:

1. Για μεν τη Λήμνο και τη Σαμοθράκη η στρατικοποίηση έχει επιτραπεί με διεθνές συμβατικό κείμενο (Σύμβαση Μοntreux 1936), γεγονός το οποίο έχει γίνει ρητώς και επανειλημμένως αποδεκτό από την τουρκική πλευρά (δήλωση του τότε Τούρκου ΥΠΕΞ Rusdi Αras στην Τουρκική Εθνοσυνέλευση 31.7.1936, επιστολή του τότε Τούρκου Πρέσβυ προς την ελληνική κυβέρνηση 6.5.1936, μνημόνιο της τουρκικής κυβερνήσεως προς τις αντίστοιχες της Αγγλίας και Γαλλίας 12.6.1936).

2. Όσον αφορά τη Λέσβο - Χίο - Σάμο και Ικαρία, από την Συνθήκη της Λωζάνης (1923) προβλέπονται απλώς περιορισμοί εξοπλισμών, και όχι αποστρατικοποίηση. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό προβλέπεται η εκεί διατήρηση αριθμού στρατιωτικών δυνάμεων, τις οποίες η Ελλάδα και διαθέτει, υπό το φως μάλιστα της ανάγκης προστασίας των ανατολικών συνόρων της.
Η νομική βάση που επικαλείται η Ελλάδα για την στρατικοποίηση των νήσων είναι το δικαίωμα νομίμου αμύνης (άρθρο 51 του Χάρτη των Ηνωμένων Εθνών). Η δε άσκηση του δικαιώματος αυτού είναι και νόμιμη και επιτακτική, ιδιαίτερα μετά την τουρκική εισβολή στην Κύπρο το 1974 και δεδομένων διαφόρων κατά καιρούς τουρκικών απειλητικών δηλώσεων περί των ελληνικών νησιών, τα οποία μάλιστα αποκαλούνται επισήμως από την τουρκική πλευρά ως "νήσοι του Αιγαίου" και όχι ελληνικοί νήσοι.

3. Για τους ίδιους τους προαναφερθέντες πραγματικούς λόγους υφίστανται στα Δωδεκάνησα ορισμένες δυνάμεις εθνοφυλακής και έχουν δηλωθεί σύμφωνα με τα προβλεπόμενα από τις διατάξεις της CFE.
Η νόμιμη άμυνα, ως ένα από τα σπουδαιότερα δικαιώματα της διεθνούς έννομης τάξεως, έχει χαρακτήρα jus cogens, δηλαδή αναγκαστικού δικαίου και με την ιδιότητα αυτή έχει αυξημένη νομική ισχύ και υπερισχύει όλων των άλλων διεθνών κανόνων. Ήδη με το άρθρο 103 του Χάρτη των Ηνωμένων Εθνών, το δικαίωμα νομίμου αμύνης που περιέχεται σ'αυτόν (άρθρο 51) παραμερίζει κάθε αντίθετη συμβατική δέσμευση.

Ειδικότερα για την Συνθήκη του Μοντρέ μια ενδιαφέρουσα οπτική απο τον Καθηγητή Ν.Σαρρή

• Μερικές σκέψεις για την Συνθήκη του Μοντρέ..

Να σημειώσουμε επίσης ότι τα περι "αποστρατικοποίησης των Δωδεκανήσων" οι Τούρκοι τα έκαναν γαργάρα σε αρκετές περιπτώσεις ,όπως για παράδειγμα την επιστροφή του καταριφθέντος Τούρκου πιλότου Μουσταφά Γιλντιρίμ με στρατιωτικό αεροσκάφος C-130 παρακαλώ απο το αεροδρόμιο της Ρόδου στην Τουρκία ,το 1995