Can Sarigul, the hope of Turkey's left, unseat Erdogan?

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s opponents have pinned their hopes on Mustafa Sarigul, Turkey’s most popular center-left politician and the mayor of Sisli district, the “Manhattan” of Istanbul. Most anti-Erdogan media believe that Sarigul is the only person who could unseat Erdogan. It is interesting, though, that Sarigul, someone I know personally, has not uttered a single word targeting Erdogan. On the contrary, he has always praised him and accorded more attention to pro-Erdogan commentators than leftist ones.

Sarigul has based his political strategy on standing close to liberals and pious Muslims. Despite his leftist background, he has always acted as a rightist and sometimes even as an Islamist politician, hence his attitude of not criticizing Erdogan. In his speeches Sarigul praises Erdogan as a great leader who has governed Turkey successfully but who is now tired and should hand over his post.

So, Turkish politics is going through a bizarre chapter in which a politician praising Erdogan is seen as the strongest candidate to unseat Erdogan.

Sarigul will run for Istanbul mayor in the March 2014 municipal elections as a candidate of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). This is now certain. Opinion polls indicate that he currently enjoys 37% support. The support for incumbent mayor, Kadir Topbas of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), stands at 45%. Given that Erdogan’s journey to power started from Istanbul, the plan to defeat him is also being built around Istanbul.

Even if he fails to win Istanbul, Sarigul will still profit from running in the election. Recently I had a lengthy lunch with him. I have the impression that he will target the CHP chairmanship after the municipal polls, based on the assumption that Sarigul would lose the race in Istanbul with about 38% of the vote. The CHP, meanwhile, is expected to garner a national average of about 23%. This would cast doubt on CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu’s leadership, and Sarigul would make an attempt to clinch his post. It is quite likely that Sarigul will be heading the CHP as of May 2014.

Sarigul, meanwhile, is under fire from some leftist commentators who argue that he avoids criticizing Erdogan not as a political tactic, but because he is extremely corrupt. According to their theory, the AKP holds myriad dossiers on Sarigul’s corrupt practices and philandering ventures. Hence, Sarigul holds back from targeting the AKP.

Here is how the pro-CHP leftist commentator, Gurkan Hacir, depicts Sarigul: “Which district of Istanbul has the most chaotic traffic, most polluted air and worst urbanization? Which municipality has the largest debt? What do you think? Let me give one answer to all questions: It is Sisli. Then, how come Sisli Mayor Sarigul is credited as the most successful mayor and, beyond that, is being marketed as the new hope of the left? Have you ever asked yourself? I have. The answer is hidden in Sarigul’s PR-designed life.”

Hacir goes on to summarize Sarigul’s personal history.

“Mustafa Sarigul was born in 1956 in the village of Gungoren in the Ilic district of Erzincan province. He finished primary school in Gungoren. Like many other Anatolian peasants, his family barely made a living in the village and headed to Istanbul. His father, Hakki, an unskilled man, took a job as a janitor in a building in the posh Nisantasi neighborhood. Despite all the hardship, he wanted to give his children education. Mustafa enrolled in the Sisli Secondary School, after which he attended the Zincirlikuyu Construction Vocational High School.

“As a young man, Sarigul became acquainted almost simultaneously with the two institutions that would change his life: the CHP and the municipality. He had joined the CHP youth branches and got a job at the IETT [the municipality-run Istanbul Electricity, Tram and Tunnel Company]. Istanbul deputy Abdurrahman Koksaloglu, a native of Sivas, was to become Sarigul’s role model in the CHP. Like Sarigul, he sat at the municipal assembly before being elected to parliament from Istanbul in 1973. Sarigul was almost a fixture in Koksaloglu’s home.

“Koksaloglu had two daughters: Hulya and Aylin. Hulya had a heart hole, and doctors did not expect her to live long. During his frequent visits, Sarigul was attracted to Hulya, who in turn, was eager to put on a wedding gown for once in her ailing existence. Koksaloglu, however, objected. He didn’t trust Sarigul. Eventually, he bowed down to his sick daughter’s wishes, but put one condition: ‘No children.’ The doctors had also warned that her ailing heart would not endure a pregnancy. Mustafa managed to get Hulya’s hand with a promise to have no children, becoming the son-in-law of CHP’s most prominent man in Istanbul. But, as expected, he did not keep his promise. Hulya Sarigul got pregnant. In Mustafa’s view, having children was [one of] God’s ‘commandments’ that should not be disobeyed. The couple had a son, whom they named Abdurrahman Emir.

“Koksaloglu owned a Pirelli retail shop on Abide-i Hurriyet Avenue called ‘Oto Sivasli.’ He also ran a car park and cab services. Two far-right militants came one evening to the tire shop. One stood on watch at the door, while the other stormed in, firing two rounds at Koksaloglu who was working at his desk. Both bullets pierced Koksaloglu’s heart. He managed to get up and drag himself into the storage room, where he collapsed on the floor. He underwent surgery but could not be saved. Keeping the business running was now up to two people: the young son-in-law, Mustafa Sarigul, and the errand-boy — Bayram Ozata. In later years, Ozata was to become an unchanging deputy mayor and see his fortunes flourish, establishing the Ozata Corporate Group.

“At Koksaloglu's funeral, Sarigul shouldered the coffin with then-Istanbul Mayor Aytekin Kotil. It was now time to get close to Kotil. A year after her father’s death, Hulya Sarigul also passed away. Mustafa Sarigul’s political fortunes were meanwhile growing. In the 1987 general elections, he entered the race from the preliminaries and emerged as the youngest ever parliament member. In 1993, he married Aylin Kotil, Aytekin Kotil’s niece.

“Sarigul’s political career got a major boost thanks to Husamettin Ozkan, Turkey’s number-two strongman from 1997 to 2002. Ahead of the 1999 local elections, Sarigul spent hours at the Democratic Left Party (DSP) headquarters and is rumored to have wept after realizing he would not be fielded as a candidate. His ambitions were taking him over. But Ozkan used his clout in Sarigul’s favor to field him as candidate for Sisli mayor. He has retained the post ever since, serving as Sisli mayor for 15 years. His popularity, however, comes primarily from funerals. Hence his nickname as 'a mourner in the funeral home, a tambourine player in the wedding hall.' He has never missed a funeral at the Tesvikiye mosque. Moreover, one could come across a funeral vehicle of the Sisli Municipality in any corner of Anatolia. The vehicles are at the disposal of anybody requesting transportation [of a dead person] to any city. A vehicle carrying the Sisli Municipality logo is always available for service.

“Sarigul has always had good ties with the media, too. Many TV journalists, who would not stop glorifying him, had their programs sponsored by Milimetrik Insaat, a construction company owned by Sarigul’s son, Emir. Another of his companies had an ironic name: Maritza, which means 'endless partnership' in Latin.

“Out of Turkey’s 500 largest companies, 420 have their head offices in Sisli. To run their businesses smoothly, they need to be on ‘good’ terms with the municipality. ‘Good’ ties with Sarigul mean smooth business. That’s the main novelty Sarigul brought to Sisli.

“Take the case of a Turkish conglomerate, the undisputed number one of the pharmaceutical sector, which had assumed that obtaining a permit for its planned shopping mall would suffice. It didn’t seek 'good' ties with Sarigul. The result was a disaster. The construction was finished, the shops were ready to open, but the required municipal licenses were not forthcoming. Sick and tired, the conglomerate’s boss headed to Ankara to complain of Sarigul to [then-CHP leader] Deniz Baykal. He still used polite language, saying that Sarigul was raising unnecessary issues. Baykal phoned Sarigul and told him to 'please help the gentleman' as much as the law allows. Sarigul was not after a fight but only 'good' ties. 'One last "paper" is missing, sir. As soon as they get it ready, I’ll issue the license,' he said. The missing 'paper' was presented, and thus 'good' ties were established.

“Sarigul had miraculous ways of creating building plots. The road to Ferikoy, for instance, was allocated to a construction company. No, you have not misread the sentence! A construction company erected a luxury residential building right on Lalasahin Avenue. The road is now curving around that building. The construction company was known to have established 'good' ties with Sarigul.

“Could Sarigul win Istanbul? The opinion polls suggest he is standing a chance. He may eventually win. But on one condition: if Erdogan allows him to win. The Sisli Municipality’s dossiers are in store at the Interior Ministry and may abruptly go public when things heat up. And Sarigul is the one who knows that best. That’s why he makes sure to make weekly calls to Mrs. Emine Erdogan [the prime minister’s wife], whom he addresses as 'abla' [elder sister]. That’s why he hugs and kisses Topbas, his potential rival, like a cheeky child when they come across each other at a funeral, and says that, 'If Topbas is in the race, I’m out.'”

So, that’s how pro-CHP commentator Hacir sees it. Sarigul’s political future is a truly intriguing matter.

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Imagining a Remapped Middle East

THE map of the modern Middle East, a political and economic pivot in the international order, is in tatters. Syria’s ruinous war is the turning point. But the centrifugal forces of rival beliefs, tribes and ethnicities — empowered by unintended consequences of the Arab Spring — are also pulling apart a region defined by European colonial powers a century ago and defended by Arab autocrats ever since.

By ROBIN WRIGHT

A different map would be a strategic game changer for just about everybody, potentially reconfiguring alliances, security challenges, trade and energy flows for much of the world, too.

Syria’s prime location and muscle make it the strategic center of the Middle East. But it is a complex country, rich in religious and ethnic variety, and therefore fragile. After independence, Syria reeled from more than a half-dozen coups between 1949 and 1970, when the Assad dynasty seized full control. Now, after 30 months of bloodletting, diversity has turned deadly, killing both people and country. Syria has crumbled into three identifiable regions, each with its own flag and security forces. A different future is taking shape: a narrow statelet along a corridor from the south through Damascus, Homs and Hama to the northern Mediterranean coast controlled by the Assads’ minority Alawite sect. In the north, a small Kurdistan, largely autonomous since mid-2012. The biggest chunk is the Sunni-dominated heartland.

Syria’s unraveling would set precedents for the region, beginning next door. Until now, Iraq resisted falling apart because of foreign pressure, regional fear of going it alone and oil wealth that bought loyalty, at least on paper. But Syria is now sucking Iraq into its maelstrom.


“The battlefields are merging,” the United Nations envoy Martin Kobler told the Security Council in July. “Iraq is the fault line between the Shia and the Sunni world and everything which happens in Syria, of course, has repercussions on the political landscape in Iraq.”

Over time, Iraq’s Sunni minority — notably in western Anbar Province, site of anti-government protests — may feel more commonality with eastern Syria’s Sunni majority. Tribal ties and smuggling span the border. Together, they could form a de facto or formal Sunnistan. Iraq’s south would effectively become Shiitestan, although separation is not likely to be that neat.

The dominant political parties in the two Kurdish regions of Syria and Iraq have longstanding differences, but when the border opened in August, more than 50,000 Syrian Kurds fled to Iraqi Kurdistan, creating new cross-border communities. Massoud Barzani, president of Iraqi Kurdistan, has also announced plans for the first summit meeting of 600 Kurds from some 40 parties in Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran this fall.

“We feel that conditions are now appropriate,” said Kamal Kirkuki, the former speaker of Iraq’s Kurdish Parliament, about trying to mobilize disparate Kurds to discuss their future.

Outsiders have long gamed the Middle East: What if the Ottoman Empire hadn’t been divvied up by outsiders after World War I? Or the map reflected geographic realities or identities? Reconfigured maps infuriated Arabs who suspected foreign plots to divide and weaken them all over again.

I had never been a map gamer. I lived in Lebanon during the 15-year civil war and thought it could survive splits among 18 sects. I also didn’t think Iraq would splinter during its nastiest fighting in 2006-7. But twin triggers changed my thinking.

The Arab Spring was the kindling. Arabs not only wanted to oust dictators, they wanted power decentralized to reflect local identity or rights to resources. Syria then set the match to itself and conventional wisdom about geography.

New borders may be drawn in disparate, and potentially chaotic, ways. Countries could unravel through phases of federation, soft partition or autonomy, ending in geographic divorce.

Libya’s uprising was partly against the rule of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. But it also reflected Benghazi’s quest to separate from domineering Tripoli. Tribes differ. Tripolitanians look to the Maghreb, or western Islamic world, while Cyrenaicans look to the Mashriq, or eastern Islamic world. Plus, the capital hogs oil revenues, even though the east supplies 80 percent of it.

So Libya could devolve into two or even three pieces. The Cyrenaica National Council in eastern Libya declared autonomy in June. Southern Fezzan also has separate tribal and geographic identities. More Sahelian than North African in culture, tribes and identity, it could split off too.

Other states lacking a sense of common good or identity, the political glue, are vulnerable, particularly budding democracies straining to accommodate disparate constituencies with new expectations.

After ousting its longtime dictator, Yemen launched a fitful National Dialogue in March to hash out a new order. But in a country long rived by a northern rebellion and southern separatists, enduring success may depend on embracing the idea of federation — and promises to let the south vote on secession.

A new map might get even more intriguing. Arabs are abuzz about part of South Yemen’s eventually merging with Saudi Arabia. Most southerners are Sunni, as is most of Saudi Arabia; many have family in the kingdom. The poorest Arabs, Yemenis could benefit from Saudi riches. In turn, Saudis would gain access to the Arabian Sea for trade, diminishing dependence on the Persian Gulf and fear of Iran’s virtual control over the Strait of Hormuz.

The most fantastical ideas involve the Balkanization of Saudi Arabia, already in the third iteration of a country that merged rival tribes by force under rigid Wahhabi Islam. The kingdom seems physically secured in glass high-rises and eight-lane highways, but it still has disparate cultures, distinct tribal identities and tensions between a Sunni majority and a Shiite minority, notably in the oil-rich east.

Social strains are deepening from rampant corruption and about 30 percent youth unemployment in a self-indulgent country that may have to import oil in two decades. As the monarchy moves to a new generation, the House of Saud will almost have to create a new ruling family from thousands of princes, a contentious process.

Other changes may be de facto. City-states — oases of multiple identities like Baghdad, well-armed enclaves like Misurata, Libya’s third largest city, or homogeneous zones like Jabal al-Druze in southern Syria — might make a comeback, even if technically inside countries.

A century after the British adventurer-cum-diplomat Sir Mark Sykes and the French envoy François Georges-Picot carved up the region, nationalism is rooted in varying degrees in countries initially defined by imperial tastes and trade rather than logic. The question now is whether nationalism is stronger than older sources of identity during conflict or tough transitions.

Syrians like to claim that nationalism will prevail whenever the war ends. The problem is that Syria now has multiple nationalisms. “Cleansing” is a growing problem. And guns exacerbate differences. Sectarian strife generally is now territorializing the split between Sunnis and Shiites in ways not seen in the modern Middle East.

But other factors could keep the Middle East from fraying — good governance, decent services and security, fair justice, jobs and equitably shared resources, or even a common enemy. Countries are effectively mini-alliances. But those factors seem far off in the Arab world. And the longer Syria’s war rages on, the greater the instability and dangers for the whole region.


Robin Wright is the author of “Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World” and a distinguished scholar at the United States Institute of Peace and the Wilson Center.

Πηγή: The New York Times

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The shame of Sept. 6-7 is always with us

By Mehmet Ali BIRAND
 

I am one of the living witnesses of what happened in Istanbul 50 years ago. I was 14 years old. I did not know what it was all about. However, the passage of time made me understand the seriousness of the incidents and I always carry the shame.

I am one of the living witnesses of what happened in Istanbul 50 years ago. I was 14 years old. I did not know what it was all about. However, the passage of time made me understand the seriousness of the incidents, and I always carry the shame. Even though it was the only such incident in which the Turkish state officially admitted its culpability and tried to compensate its victims, it still continues to weigh on our conscience.

I can never forget.

I can still remember what I saw in Beyoğlu on the morning of Sept. 7, 1955.

I had to go to Galatasaray High School to register for their preliminary class. I reached Beyoğlu with great difficulty. When I went to Tunel from Karaköy, I just was flabbergasted.

The scene was shocking.

The huge street seemed like a war zone, with windows of the shops on both sides of the street shattered and all their goods strewn all over the street. Bunches of clothes, books, notebooks, chandeliers and much more. People were taking home whatever they could find. The scene was like judgment day.

I was a child, and I had no idea what had happened.

What I noticed immediately was that while some shops were plundered, others were not even touched. I had a look and saw that there was a Turkish flag hanging on the windows of the shops that were not looted. Those that were had Greek names.

People with long beards and those who were dressed very shabbily were walking around. I saw that some people who were dressed normally were hiding in the shops, looking outside.

The police and the soldiers seemed like they were saying: "Enough is enough. You did what you did, but now just leave." They were both intervening and not intervening at the same time.

That scene has always remained with me.

Even though half a century has passed, I still shiver when I remember it. When I read the newspapers a day later, I realized the extent of the matter.

Similar incidents had occurred also in Taksim and Şişli, where most of the citizens of Greek origin lived. Not only the shops, but also churches, even cemeteries were damaged and plundered. Jewish citizens also got their share of trouble, but the main targets were Greeks.

Newspapers were writing about people waving Turkish flags, pleading with the looters: "Please don't do it. I'm a Turk. I am a Turkish citizen."

It was a disgusting, belittling and tragic affair.

My mother and other adults were criticizing what had happened, while officials were talking about "the placing of a bomb at the house in Thessaloniki where Atatürk was born, which had been turned into a museum, and the anger felt against what was happening in Cyprus," explaining that the people had become enraged.

We were living on Ethem Efendi Street at the time. Our neighbors were mostly Greek. They were my best friends. All of a sudden, they shut themselves in their homes. They talked to no one. I can never forget Madam Eleni when she asked, "Can we seek refuge in your home if they attack us?" The barbershop she managed with her husband was in ruins. They were in shock. My mother sent them food for a week. We let them live in one of our rooms.

I was too young to make sense of what had happened. Why should they attack Madam Eleni? What could they ask from them? Why were they different from me?

As I was seeking answers to these questions, the Greek families in our neighborhood started to move to other places or go to Greece. After 1963 none of them were left. They left Istanbul.

They took with them an important culture, a color and a different lifestyle.

They left us alone in Istanbul to live our colorless lives.

Later on we were full of regret, but by then it was too late.


Turkey admitted all culpability, accepted responsibility:

Much later, we learned the Sept. 6-7 incidents were the doing of the infamous "deep state." It was planned with government approval in order to let diplomats say "The people are reacting" during the U.N. discussions on Cyprus. However, it later got out of control and turned into a shameful plunder. It became a crime that the deep state could not handle, and it shamed the Turkish nation.

What's interesting is that apart from a few injuries, no one was killed. It wasn't a massacre. It was a disgusting plunder aimed at frightening people.

What's even more interesting is the way Sept. 6-7 shamed us and hurt us and tainted us as a nation.

This was also recorded as the only such incident when the Republic of Turkey officially admitted its responsibility, apologized and compensated the victims.

At the Yassıada trials, after the May 21, 1960 military coup, the Sept. 6-7 incidents were investigated down to the smallest detail, and those held responsible were tried and punished.

As always, there was no mention as the deep state. It emerged entirely unscathed by the affair. A few thieves, civilians with no links to the planning or to the politicians, were punished.

In the later years, whenever the Sept. 6-7 incidents were mentioned, I felt an overwhelming shame and I always apologized to the victims I saw at international meetings.

During the Sept. 6-7 incidents our Turkishness was trampled underfoot. It was then I realized that if we don't criticize such incidents and apologize to the victims, we can never feel proud of ourselves.

Apologizing is enriching. It shows self-confidence.

Discriminating due to religion, language or culture or using force on the weak is belittling one's self.

I don't know you, but I apologize to our neighbor Madam Eleni from Erenköy.

Πηγή: Ηurriyet

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F-35 Customers, Competitors, and Challenges

O διεθνούς φήμης δημοσιογράφος Bill Sweetman του γνωστού περιοδικού Αviaton Week and Space Technology γράφει για τις τελευταίες εξελίξεις στο πρόγραμμα του F-35:

By Bill Sweetman, Amy Butler

June 17, 2013

The F-35 fighter program remains fully funded despite delays and overruns,
but acquisition plans for the U.S. and some partner nations are in flux.
Orders have been delayed or cut by some partners and further delays are
possible now that the 3F software release needed for international
countries to declare initial operational capability has slipped to 2019. One
hundred of the original 730 partner orders have been removed from
acquisition plans due to increasing cost and defense budget reductions
globally.

Almost 360 more are jeopardized by planning changes and political
challenges. Denmark has launched a new source-selection process with a
mid-2015 decision deadline. The Canadian government launched a review of its
choice of the stealthy Joint Strike Fighter, after the nation's
auditorgeneral found flaws in the sole-source plan and it is under pressure
to start a competition. The U.K. and Australia remain committed, but some of
their purchases are likely to be deferred beyond 2030, while major political
groups in Italy (including the fast-growing M5S movement) and the
Netherlands are opposed to buying any F-35s.

The U.S. services have held to their total buys -- but those are subject to
decisions of future Congresses, since fewer than half of the planned orders
will be placed in the next 10 years. Multiple Washington think-tanks,
including the influential Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
have recommended reducing F-35 orders (and in some cases, tactical fighter
forces in general) in favor of longer-range systems.

The U.S. Navy's peak annual JSF acquisition rate (for both the B and C
models) has been reduced to 40 from 50 aircraft per year, according to the
latest selected acquisition report. Nominally, the U.S. Air Force plans to
increase its delivery rate to 60 per year in 2018 and 80 in 2021, but this
does not mesh with service testimony to Congress that shows 1,130 or more
older aircraft, including 300-plus updated F-16s, in its 2030 inventory.
That would leave the Air Force with 770 F-35s, but current plans show 1,050
JSFs delivered to the service by 2030. The Air Force has not been willing to
comment on the discrepancy.

By contrast, Lockheed Martin has nabbed sales to Israel and Japan and is in
the running for orders in South Korea and Singapore.

These developments have opened up opportunities for competitors to challenge
the F-35 in U.S. and international markets with upgraded versions of
in-service aircraft. Boeing will flight-test features of a stealthier, more
powerful, longer-range Advanced F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in the coming months
and Australia has announced its intention to acquire EA-18G Growlers, which
would be the first-ever export sale of a dedicated fighter-based electronic
combat aircraft. Two development contracts for the Saab JAS 39E Gripen were
issued in February and March by Sweden. Meanwhile, the Eurofighter partner
nations -- seeing opportunities in the United Arab Emirates, Canada, and
Denmark, among others -- appear to be more ready to back the consortium&# 39;s
product-improvement plans, a Eurofighter executive says.

-- Amy Butler and Bill Sweetman/Washington

Software: U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, F-35 program director,
is "moderately confident" of on-time delivery of the fighter' s 2B software
package for the U.S. Marine Corps to be the first to declare initial
operational capability (IOC) by December 2015. Likewise, the 3I release,
including 2B software and updated hardware, is needed for the Air Force's
IOC planned for December 2016. Bogdan acknowledges greater risk in the
readiness of the 3F package, which will include a more comprehensive attack
capability, when development wraps up in 2017 (AW&ST July 9, 2012, p. 103).

Helmet: Questions remain about whether Rockwell Collins Vision Systems
International will deliver the so-called "Gen 3" helmet-mounted display
system needed for full F-35 performance. The Marine Corps plans to declare
F-35B IOC in December 2015 with the "Gen 2" helmet on which the night-vision
camera falls short of requirements for nighttime aerial refueling and
vertical landing. A new nighttime camera will be tested on a Gen 3 helmet in
January. Questions remain about whether earlier jitter and horizon
calibration issues will be addressed in this next helmet version. (AW&ST
June 10, p. 29).

Testing, "Concurrency Cost": Customers, especially those buying early such
as the U.S., U.K., and the Netherlands, are exposed to the financial risk of
taking ownership of aircraft that will require retrofits to address issues
found in flight or durability testing, which is not expected to wrap up
until 2017. Additionally, F135 engine manufacturer Pratt & Whitney is
conducting durability testing with particular attention to whether
high-cycle fatigue could cause more cracking than predicted in the
low-pressure turbine. This risk is prompting some customers to delay their
purchases until the configuration is solid and fully tested, adding to the
price of early deliveries (AW&ST Dec. 24, 2012, p. 39).

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Skywatcher: Αφιέρωμα του Air International στην δράση των ελληνικών ΑΣΕΠΕ στη Λιβύη

Το τελευταίο τεύχος του Air International φιλοξενεί ένα εξόχως ενδιαφέρον αφιέρωμα στην επιχειρησιακή δράση της 380 Μοίρας ΑΣΕΠΕ "Ουρανός" κατά τη διάρκεια των Νατοϊκών επιχειρήσεων στη Λιβύη. Ακολουθεί ένα απόσπασμα του εν λόγω άρθρου (γράφει ο Kirk Paloulian) (σημ  Κυριάκος Παλουλιάν):

Operations
During the night of March 31-April 1, 2011, the HAF EMB-145H undertook its first OUP mission providing ΑWACS/AEW coverage to CAOC 5 of traffic in Libyan airspace. The aircraft flew in racetrack patterns from areas over the Mediterranean, south-west of Crete, to 120km (75 miles) north-northwest of Benghazi. During these missions the aircraft operated adjacent to and south of the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR) and within the JOA – both shared a common border to the southwest of Crete.

The EMB-145H supported efforts to suppress Libyan Arab Air Force (LARAF) fighter activity. The eastern holding areas in which it operated were in range of the LARAF SA-5 Gammon surface-to-air missile (SAM) positions, which were shown to crews on the latest information briefing cards.
There was only one instance when the EMB-145H tracked an active SA-5 site, although it also tracked the positions of mobile, smaller-range antiaircraft batteries such as SA-2 Guideline, SA-3 Goa, SA-6 Gainful and SA-8 Geckos. In this way the EMB-145H formed part of the coalition’s suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) and electronic warfare (EW) network to neutralize any threats. From intelligence reports, reconnaissance assets and electronic support measures (ESM) it became clear that SEAD was successful and LARAF fighter activity was minimised.

Surveillance Targets
In addition to SEAD and ESM, the EMB-145H also performed air surveillance, ocean surface picture (SURPIC), defensive counter air (DCA), offensive counter air (OCA) and close air support (CAS) and reconnaissance, undertaking track relays of airborne and surface targets via its Link 11/Link 16 datalinks. It was also ordered by CAOC 5 to direct CAP fighters to visually identify LARAF fighters and helicopters.

An example of the EMB-145H’s use as an air surveillance relay came when it tracked LARAF helicopters operating in the areas of Al Jambijia, Benina, Misrata and Sirte. There happened to be a slow mover in one of these areas and the air surveillance/helicopter mode in the EMB-145H’s systems identified it as an Mi-8/Mi-17 – the system can pick up a rotor even when a helicopter is hovering. The HAF mission crew tagged the helicopter as a potential target that required visual identification by NATO fighters prior to being shot down, but CAOC 5 gave a negative on the intercept.

MiG Chase
A particularly interesting mission occurred one afternoon when an LARAF MiG-21 took off and headed east towards the border with Egypt. As there was no indication of its intentions, the EMB-145H flew alongside, keeping a 150km (80nm) lateral distance from it. The MiG-21 altitude varied between 2,000ft and 5,000ft (610m-1,524m) and gave no IFF read out. The HAF fighter allocator directed a pair of French Air Force Mirage 2000-5Fs to chase it. The MiG-21 was not intercepted by the French fighters and was assumed to have landed at a forward operating base in the southern desert. The EMB-145H provided tracking throughout this chase.

Command & Control
The EMB-145H was also used for operational control. It provided ESM for coalition air-refuelling aircraft, which included a Turkish Air Force KC-135R and four Turkish F-16Cs during day and nighttime missions. The EMB-145H crew relayed the exact position of the Turkish aircraft to other land-based and airborne C2 units. Working alongside E-3 AWACS the aircraft also relayed the recognised air and surface pictures, and any suspected air traffic. On a few occasions, in place of an E-3 AWACS, the EMB-145H was tasked to provide C2 by relaying and receiving geographical co-ordinates of suspected SAM sites and other convoys.

Additionally it worked alongside air traffic control cells in the allocation of civil air traffic flows in the vicinity, including assisting with ATC coverage for aircraft carrying humanitarian aid into Libya. The last OUP mission flown by 380 AEW Squadron took place on October 30, 2011. All four of the squadron’s aircraft had participated in the NATO air campaign.


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The integration of the EMB-145H in OUP was deemed a great success. The commander of the CAOC at Izmir, USAF Lt Gen Ralph Jodice, an ex-F-15 Eagle pilot, visited 380 AEW Squadron in Souda to congratulate the HAF crews. In total the detachment took part in 170 missions. Only one was cancelled – and that was due to the weather conditions in Souda. The EMB-145Hs that participated in the missions logged 980 flight hours. The lessons learnt from this operation have proved to be most valuable as was the experience gained working in foreign airspace.

hellarmforces2010

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The Pontus independence movement and the Greek Genocide

Liman von Sander (left) with Mustapha Kemal (right)

by Sait Çetinoğlu

The growth of nationalism in the 19th century directly affected the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire. The ideology of the Orthodox Greeks scattered throughout the Balkans and in Anatolia was linked to the Hellenic state, and under the influence of a bourgeoisie leadership it began to spread. However the Greeks living in the distant Black Sea shores of Anatolia had little contact with the free Hellenic state which gained its independence in 1821.

1) Introduction

The growth of nationalism in the 19th century directly affected the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire. The ideology of the Orthodox Greeks scattered throughout the Balkans and in Anatolia was linked to the Hellenic state, and under the influence of a bourgeoisie leadership it began to spread. However the Greeks living in the distant Black Sea shores of Anatolia had little contact with the free Hellenic state which gained its independence in 1821.

The process of identity crisis in the 19th and 20th centuries played a part in the formation of modern Hellenism. The main reasons for this are the prevailing new political and international conditions in the region, the end result being the transformation of cultural identity into a political identity.

2) The Black Sea and the Revolutionary Movement

The Pontus issue is directly related to the international revolutionary movement. Lenin, as a leader of the Communist movement, was proposing the liberation of nations on one hand, while on the other he was saying:

"I and the Bolsheviks are the Young Turks of the Soviet Revolution".

In fact one can easily see a contradiction in these two statements. Contrary to this, Rosa Luxemburg while being captive in a Berlin prison, called for full support to the Christian communities of the Ottoman Empire by saying:

"A country has no hope of progress if it remains under Turkish domination. Concerning the Eastern issue, it is our duty to accept the fragmentation of Turkey and show unconditional solidarity to the Christian people".

Rosa Luxemburg1 in her work:" The activities of German imperialism in Turkey" wrote about the supreme economic and military interests of Germans in Turkey. The Ottoman lands were the main aims of the German imperialists. On this issue an important role was played by German banks. Along this line many propaganda instruments were devised such as the organization on November 8, 1898 of a ceremony in Damascus by the German Kaiser and his delegation, declaring that they were walking on the footsteps of Salahettin Eyubbi under the green flag of the Prophet to defend the Muslim community and gave an oath to this. As Rosa Luxemburg said, the role undertaken by Germans to resurrect the Ottoman Empire was nothing more than to paint a dead man with make-up. The disclosure by Rosa Luxemburg that the construction of the Baghdad railway line during the First World War was based on the massacre of masses of people is an important statement to be emphasized. The role of Deutsche Bank has been crucial. The German officials had made great efforts to fanaticize the Muslims and Turks against the non-Muslim communities of the Empire after the Balkan Wars. The testimony of Dido Sotiriou2 on the role of the Deutsche Palestinian Bank is significant. This Bank printed brochures in Turkish saying that:

"If we Turks are poor and suffering, the causes of this are the infidels (gavurs) who grasped the wealth from our hands. How long will we afford this? Do not buy their products and do not have any dealings with them. What do you expect from a friendship with them? Why are you offering them so much love and brotherhood".

On this matter, German Field Marshal Liman von Sanders in 1916 ordered the deportation of Greeks from the coastal areas of Anatolia. After realizing that despite all the exiles, the Greeks of Ayvalik were remaining in their homes, on Easter day of 1917 von Sanders ordered their deportation by saying:


"Have you not yet expelled these infidels!"

German imperialism wanted Anatolia to be cleared of its Christian element. The same could also be said of the other western powers. If one studies the behavior of England, France, USA and Italy during World War I and beyond, it would not be wrong in saying that these countries were indifferent to the annihilation of the ancient peoples of Anatolia.
3) The Political Organization in Pontus.

All the state influenced Turkish publications on the Pontus issue are almost identical because they use the same source as a reference. All these publications are based on a propaganda piece printed in 1922 by the Information and Printing Establishment (Matbuat ve İstihbarat Matbaası) under the title "The Pontus Affair" (Pontos Meselesi). In all the mentioned publications the same arguments are stated. In the propaganda publication of 1922, it mentions that the Greeks of the Black Sea shoreline were aiming to establish an independent Republic of the Pontus with its capital city being Trabzon or Samsun and its territories to extend from Batumi all the way to Sinope. This is far from what really happened in Pontus. Mustapha Kemal used the same arguments in his Speech (Nutuk).

At the commencement of the First World War, the Greeks of Pontus which until that time had served in the Ottoman Army merely as hard laborers, like the other people of the Empire wanted to enlist in the Ottoman armed forces. It is a historical fact that during the course of World War I, many peasants deserted the army and returned to areas near their home villages with or without their weapons to resume their lives in their rural areas. In this way they began to set up armed irregular guerrilla groups in the various parts of mountainous regions of Anatolia as in the Black Sea zone.



A group of armed resistance fighters

The efforts of the Ottoman government to settle Muslim refugees from Balkan lands into the Greek villages of the Black Sea region was the cause of the second phase of unrest leading to ethnic clashes. The decision of the Pontic Greeks to refuse entry of these refugees into their villages was the beginning of the resistance against the state authorities. Faced with this situation, the Government in Autumn of 1915 started military operations against the villages Okse, Tsichman and Tefkeris. These places were the focus of resistance against the establishment of Balkan refugees. Villages began being burned, populations dispersed and fighters such as Vasilis Anthopoulos (Vasil Usta) emerged and armed resistance groups were formed. Many armed groups were concentrated in the Nebian town of the Bafra region.

Up until the Balkan Wars, the prevailing view among Pontic Greek scholars was that it would be possible to create a Turkish-Pontic Union in peace and cooperation with the Turks in the wider region of the Black Sea. The role of the Bishop of Trabzon Chrysanthos in the dissemination of this view and his role through the "Eastern Party" is of paramount importance.

After the Balkan wars and before the First World War the Young Turks began the implementation of a "solution plan" of ethnic problems by the extermination of other ethnicities as decided in 1911 at a Conference held in Thessaloniki. The extermination operations started in the beginning of the War by the process of deportations. The establishment of an independent Republic of Pontus therefore gained support as a result of these actions by the Young Turks.

During this period, throughout the entire Black Sea shore region, the development of self defense groups was aimed at defending the political rights of the Greeks of Pontus which had started to gain momentum. On February 4, 1918 Konstantinos Konstantinidis, the son of the former Mayor of Giresun Captain George, having been influenced by the proclamation of the Soviets on the right of "self determination of peoples" by the Bolsheviks, organized a conference in Marseille with the participation of Pontic Greek representatives from various European countries including the USA and elsewhere. The Conference members sought the support of the Soviets and sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Leon Trotsky. The letter stated that it would be a big mistake to return the city and the region of Trabzon to Turkish rule. Support was also asked from the Soviets to achieve the establishment of an independent Pontic Republic.


A printed card depicting the proposed Republic of Pontus

4) East and West Pontus

After the occupation of the Eastern Black-Sea shore by the Russian Army in the Summer of 1916, the Pontus region was divided into two parts and as a result, the course of events changed in the two regions. When the Russian Army halted its advance at Gemoura, the fall of Trebizond to the Russians was inevitable. The Turkish administration seeing the inevitability of the fall of Trebizond, called Bishop Chrysanthos and other Greek notables to hand the city over to them and asked them for the protection of the civilian Muslim population. After a short ceremony, Governor Azmi speaking to Chrysanthos said:

"We took this country from the Greeks and now we give it back to the Greeks".

ImageOn August 16, 1916 the Russians entered Trebizond and found a Greek administration in control of the city. The reception of the Pontic Greeks to the Russians was warm. Chrysanthos established a Council of Christian and Muslim members which under his leadership ruled the region until the return of the Turkish Army. Bishop Chrysanthos protected the families of Muslims whose men had fled because of the fear of Russians. He also tried to introduce a new spirit of equality among nations. The independent administration of Trebizond also met with Soviet representatives during 1917.

The situation in western Pontus was very different. The armed rebels who had fled to the mountains and consisted of independent non-coordinated guerilla groups, started accepting more men in their ranks towards the end of 1916 when deportations of the Greek population by the Turkish forces began. On July 3, 1916 Vasil Anthopoulos formed an armed resistance group in Sivas, with the hope that when the Russian forces moved to the west of Pontus it would start a general revolution. But the halt of the Russian advance changed Anthopoulos' plans. Believing the Russians were playing games with him, Anthopoulos decided to create new conditions in the region. Then, with his armed group of 80 irregulars, he attacked Turkish villages, killed and burned homes of those he thought had harmed Christians. In Ordu (Kotyora) he clashed with Turkish military forces and after losing the battle took refuge in Trabzon where he lived until the end of the war. The reaction of the Turks concerning these two events was twofold: (a) counter attacks on Greek guerillas, and (b) exiles of the Greeks in western Pontus (Black Sea shore) towards the inner regions of Anatolia.

The first reaction seems to have been more of a local type response. Both Christians and Muslims were army deserters while the Muslim deserters were ready to implement the nationalist policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The most active irregular guerilla group was that of Topal Osman Agha from Giresun. He and his followers were army deserters and fugitives which were acting freely without any control. Topal Osman was the source of indescribable terror and horror. Even the local Muslim population was asking for his removal from the region.

Among the Pontic Greek armed rebels, the most notable guerilla leader was Anton Pasha. While defending Pontic Greek villages with his wife Pelagia, he became the main source of fear to the Turkish administration and the Muslim irregular forces. He was killed in 1917 while his wife Pelagia continued the struggle until 1923. In the same area, among the Muslim armed groups, there were also Circassians.

5) The Exiles

In a document prepared to be sent by the Austrian Foreign Ministry to Berlin, the following was stated:

"The Turkish policy has the nature of a complete expulsion of the Greeks in the region, aiming at their total extinction by using the excuse that the Greeks of the region are posing a risk against the State, an argument used in the past against the Armenians. The Turks do not discern any difference among the population, leaving no chances to their survival under the pretext of moving all the Greeks to other regions as deportations of the population from the shores towards the interior, leaving them in appalling, inhumane conditions so that the hunger will lead them to death. Their homes after being occupied by the Muslim irregular forces (tsettes) are looted, burned and demolished. Similar measures used against the Armenians are also being used in the region of Pontos".3

The Pontic Greek guerilla forces, although not being able to prevent the deportation of the Greek population, established "liberated zones" in mountainous areas where refuge was provided to the Greeks escaping their destroyed villages. The appearance of new Pontian rebel groups and the inability of the Turk
ish Army to destroy them leads to a regional compromise with the Turkish village population who provided food and supplies to the Pontian guerilla groups.

After the defeat of the Ottoman State in the First World War, British forces (Indian soldiers with British officers) were placed in the Black Sea shore regions of Anatolia. In order for Britain to ensure its future interests it required the Pontic Greek guerilla forces to surrender their weapons to the Turkish Army. The guerillas didn't fall for this trap and refused to hand in their weapons. The Pontic Greeks embraced the establishment of a Pontic Republic. Meanwhile about 100.000 Pontic Greeks returned home from Russia.

The Pontus movement had reached such a critical stage that it began to concern the Ottoman State, which led the Istanbul based Ottoman government to send Mustapha Kemal Pasha to the Black Sea region. Mustafa Kemal began his efforts to quell the Pontus movement at the request of Britain and the moral and material support of Sultan Mehmet Vahdetin. Mustapha Kemal arrived in Samsun and met with Britain's Major Hurst and invited representatives of the various communities to the local command garrison. The leader of the local Greeks, Bishop Germanos did not respond to this invitation. The report sent by Mustapha Kemal to the Sultan Government said that Pontus guerrilla forces led by Bishop Germanos didn't come to the invitation. Meanwhile Mustapha Kemal on his arrival in Samsun on May 19, 1919 immediately began organizing Turkish irregular groups to act against the Pontic Greek guerrillas who were seeking independence. It is mentioned that Topal Osman was one of the first leaders of the irregulars (tsettes) Mustapha Kemal met. As shown in public records, Mustapha Kemal put more importance to the Pontian guerrilla movement than on the Hellenic State armed forces which had landed forces in western Anatolia.

6) The End of the Movement and Ethnic Cleansing

After the initial successes of the Pontian guerillas and despite their efforts to unite their forces, it led to a decline in their strength due to an absence of any coordinated center. The decline of morale among the Pontian rebels was fast. The Turkish Army with the significant help of the Bolsheviks was being reorganized and support by the Italian and the French also strengthened its position. These developments discouraged the intentions of the Pontic Greek guerilla forces in forming a common command centre and they started becoming completely independent. There were even clashes between various guerilla groups. The end was tragic. Despite the sheepish attitude of the Greece towards the Pontus movement, the Greeks of Pontus always showed a trend of identifying themselves with the Hellenic State.

In order to compete with the actions of the Greek guerillas in the region the government in Ankara began deporting and exiling the Greek population that was providing support to the guerillas. Ankara was determined to enlist in its Army every Pontic Greek that had the ability to endanger the stability in the region. All non-Muslims were sent to labor battalions. Although some Pontic Greeks did not obey, a significant number were sent to the work battalions, known as Amele Taburlari, and through this measure those men were inactivated.

After this, a mandatory collection of arms was initiated in the region starting with the non-Muslims. Resistance was raised against the army units coming to collect the arms in the region of Samsun and in other areas. The most severe clashes took place in areas such as Tokat, Carshamba and in Nebian of Bafra. This effort which began in April 6, 1921 by the Turkish Army, and despite the implementation of extensive violence by the Army units, did not give any result. The Turkish army units were strengthened with the Giresun Divison after having failed in their objectives at Carshamba and Nebian-Bafra. The Ankara government then declared the region of the Black Sea a war zone and decided on June 21, 1921 to exile all the Greeks of Pontus. Furthermore, most of the rural regions had been cleared of Greeks and the Greek villages burned down.

ImageBecause of the fear of the Hellenic Navy landing in Samsun, the Executive Government Committee in Ankara after its decision on June 16, 1921, decided on the deportation of all the Greek men in the region between the ages of 16 to 50 years. Arrests of Greeks then started in the areas of Samsun and Bafra (in the Alatsam region). On the following day, the first group of deportees departed southward and while passing near the town of Kavak, it went under fire from either Turkish or Greek guerillas (depending on the information source, Greek or Turkish). Several guards accompanying the exiled Greeks were also killed. Similar events occurred during the deportation marches during the month of June 1921. The attacks were caused by irregular Turkish forces (tsettes) with the cooperation of the guards escorting the exiled Greeks. In these attacks an important role was played by the irregular armed groups of Topal Osman Agha and Saki Ali from Tokat. The reactions to the events according to a letter sent by the Ministry of Interior on June 25, 1921 indicates that the displacement of the Greeks was being carried out due to military reasons, which were not an act of deportation, while it was mentioned that the livelihood of the exiled Greeks should be protected and also the lives, fortune and honor of the Greek women and children remaining in their home should be protected. In this order, severe punishments were sought to those state officials who attacked women and children as well as the exiled men.

We learn from the Minister of Health at the time Riza Nur that in practice things didn't exactly happen this way. Riza Nur4 who later became the chief negotiator at the Lausanne negotiations, wrote in his memoires about conversations he had with Topal Osman:

"I told him, Aga clear the Black Sea well. Do not leave a stone in the Greek villages of the Black Sea".

He replied to me:

"I will do exactly that, but I will protect and will not destroy their churches and buildings because they might be useful in the future".

I told him:

"Demolish the buildings and churches as well and scatter their stones away. You never know what will happen in the future. Nobody should be able to come here in the future and say ‘there was a church here'".

The answer given by Topal Osman was:

"I will do it that way, I wasn't thinking correctly".

Riza Nur also writes that Topal Osman was the new Kioroglu, making reference to the legendary Turkish public hero who revolted against the Sultan centuries ago.

When the government in Ankara forced troops from the region of the Black Sea to the western front, it reduced the number of exiles. However after the failure of the Hellenic Army at Sakarya, the exiles resumed on a massive scale in the Black Sea region. During this period, the cleansing operations against the Greek guerillas in the mountains was intensified and the exiles continued to increase. On the order of Nurettin Pasha, women were also deported despite the initial orders not to include them. There had not been any reaction to this by his superiors in Ankara. According to Nurettin Pasha:

"Greeks are snakes and their women are their poison. These women support their men who are fascinated with the dream of Pontus both physically, morally and materially".

In addition to this, in the notorious Independence Courts (Istiklal Mahkemeleri) in Amasya, women were also tried, being accused of spying, fomenting crimes and helping criminals to hide.

During these operations in the Black Sea, after discussions held in the Parliament at Ankara, the Commander of the Central Army Nurettin Pasha was dismissed on November 8, 1921 on the grounds of his illegal activities and incompetence, while on February 8, 1922 the administration of the Central Army was abolished. The responsibility of the operations against the Greeks of Pontus was then assigned to the 10th Brigade operating under the orders of the Ministry of Interior. Cemil Cahit Bey was appointed as commander of this Brigade. The Turkish armed forces increased its recruiting and also its arms, and ended the Pontus issue in February 1923, an issue that had been running for many years.


7) Conclusion

Despite all this, the beginning of the end for the Black Sea Greeks really began in December of 1920 after the wholesale defeat of the Armenians by the Kemalist Army, who then established relations with the Bolsheviks. The Soviet support flowed to the Kemalists while agreements were then signed between the Soviets and Britain, the Soviets and the Turkish Ankara administration, and Britain with the Minister of Exterior Affairs of the Ankara administration Bekir Sami on March 16, 1921. On this day, Britain effectively declared their neutrality. The Hellenic state left the Greeks of Pontus to their fate. Britain supported Turkey thinking that it would serve as a buffer or as an intermediary with the Soviet Union. The realpolitik at the time was the reason that determined the end of the Pontus movement. After the signing of the Lausanne Treaty the guerilla forces that remained in the Black Sea region escaped from the shores of the Black Sea by boats on their way to Greece or fled to nearby Russia.



References

1. R Luxemburg, Ausgeıvahlte Reden und Schriften, Berlin 1951, pages.. 294, 297.
2. See the book authored by Dido Sotiriou "The Blooded Landed".
3. P.K.Enepekidis, The Genocide of Anatolian Hellenism, 7-14 July 1985, Conference in Thessaloniki. .
4. Rıza Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım (My Life and memoirs),Publisher İşaret, year 1992 , page 164.



Biography of the Author

Sait Çetinoglu was born in Trabzon. He is an activist on human rights and a member of the Free University An¬kara Independent Initiative. He has not been a member of any political organization since the military takeover of 1980 while he has been pursuing is work as an independent political researcher. His work on human rights issues has been carried out under the Free University, Human Rights Association (IHD) of Turkey, Amnesty International and Ankara Freedom to Throughout Initiative. He has been a member of the Administrative Board of the IHD and among the first members of the Amnesty International in Turkey serving also as a coordinator.

He has been editor of the Human Rights Publications and Humanite Journal. He also worked as editor in the publications of the Free University, Belge and Peri publishing houses in Turkey concerning the publications on "minority issues".

He authored the book on "Varlik Vergisi 1942-1944- Ekonomik ve Kültürel Jenocid (Capital Tax 1942-1944- an Economic and Cultural Genocide)" based on his research and published by Belge International Publishing House. He also coauthored with Fikret Bashkaya the research books : "İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme (From Unionists to Kemalists) and Türkiye'de "Azınlıklar" (The "Minorities" in Turkey) both published by Free University. He authored the publications: "The ‘turkification' of the Capital" and the Secret Agenda of the Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki'nin Gizli Ajandası) published in the series "Discussions on the Official History" and also authored lemmas in the Concepts Dictionary and Official Ideology on the topics official ideology/official history, genocide, issues related to Turkish economic history, etc.

His worked on "The 20 years Conscription to Work Battalions"- A Terror Act against the Minorities, The Assassination of Justice in 1909 at Cilicia and on various other topics which will be published by Belge International Publishing House in the series Myths of Official History- Sayings and Truth.

Presently he is working on the research topic of the Development of Turkish-Muslim wealth after the looting of Greek and Armenian fortunes to be published in a book entitled "The Turkish Bourgoise and the Dark side of the Turkish Economy". He has published articles on the Committee Union and Progress, Kemalism, The Nature of the Kemalist Regime, Armenian, Greek and Assyrian Genocides, The Turkish Economic History and "Minorites" at various newspapers in Turkey as well as in the journals Yevrobatsi, Collectifvan, Le monde, Nouvelles d'Armenie Magazine, Keghart, Pontos World, Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft (DAG), Agos, Marmara, Zartong, Özgür Üniversite, Birikim, Yaba, Atılım, Devrimci Demokrasi, Devrimci Halkın Günlüğü, Newroz, Gündem, Birgün, Evrensel ve Radikal... including newspapers and internet sites.

Πηγή

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F-35, υπερμαχητικό ή αποτυχία;

H εκπομπή της Αυστραλιανής τηλεόρασης ABC, Four cornens, αναλύει και αποδομεί σε μεγάλο βαθμό, όχι μόνο την διαδικασία επιλογής του F-35 από την Αυστραλιανή κυβέρνηση το 2002 αλλά και τις πολυδιαφημισμένες δυνατότητες του μαχητικού αυτού, οι καθυστερήσεις στην ανάπτυξη του οποίου συνεχίζονται εκτοξεύοντας το κόστος και καθυστερώντας σημαντικά το όλο πρόγραμμα. Οι αγγλομαθείς αξιζει να την παρακολουθησουν.

Η εκπομπή προβλήθηκε στις 18 Ιανουαρίου 2013 και σίγουρα μας ενδιαφέρει μιας και οι εξ ανατολών γείτονες συμμετέχουν κι εκείνοι στο ήδη καθυστερημένο κι εκτός προϋπολογισμού πρόγραμμα. Συμφωνα με τις τελευταίες εξελίξεις η Αυστραλία παραμένει στο σχέδιο απόκτησης 100 F-35 παρά την αγορά 12 EA-18G λόγω των καθυστερήσεων στο πρόγραμμα του F-35.

© 2013 ABC

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"The Greeks were darn good soldiers, we loved them"

I've written about the "Korean Thermopylae" previously. It is to say the least an inspiring story of courage in the face of overwhelming odds. Like many things these days it is unfortunately lost in the pages of history, a history that few people, especially the young, have any familiarity with. Combat changes a soldier forever but the friendships and mutual respect forged in its crucible can never be severed. Listening to the accounts of the Americans that fought side by side with the Greeks of Sparta battalion in Korea one can only be filled with pride. Lest we forget. Watch the whole video. If you are in a hurry jump to 6:48


Outpost Harry was a remote Korean War station located on a tiny hilltop in what was commonly referred to as the "Iron Triangle" on the Korean Peninsula. This was an area approximately 60 miles (100 km) north of Seoul and was the most direct route to the South Korean capital.

More than 88,000 rounds of Chinese artillery fell on Outpost Harry. Since the outpost was defended each night by only a single company of American or Greek soldiers, the Chinese had anticipated an easy capture. Over a period of eight days, waves of Chinese forces moved into the outposts trench lines and totalling over 13,000 soldiers. Five UNC companies, four US and one Greek, took turns in defending the outpost.

Most of the fighting occurred at night, under heavy mortar fire, while the daylight hours were usually spent by the UNC forces evacuating the dead and wounded, replacing the defending company, sending up resupplies and repairing the fortified positions. The daylight hours were punctuated with artillery, mortar and sniper fire, making repairs and reinforcement a more dangerous task. During the 4 to 5 days prior to the initial attack on the outpost, Chinese artillery and mortar fire increased from an average of 275 to 670 per day during daylight hours.

The soldiers of the Greek Expeditionary Force adapted its name and called it Outpost "Haros", the modern Greek equivalent to Charon, Greek mythology's ferryman to the underworld of Hades.

The Chinese forces employed against Outpost Harry were tabulated by U.S. Intelligence Sections:

June 10 and June 11: one reinforced regiment (approximately 3,600 troops)

June 11 and June 12: one regiment (approximately 2,850 troops)

June 12 and June 13: one reinforced regiment

June 13 and June 14: an estimated 100 troops

June 14 and June 15: an estimated 120 troops

June 17 and June 18: one regiment.

During this period the entire 74th Division was utilized against this position and at the end of the engagement was considered combat ineffective. Rounds fired in support of their attack amounted to 88,810 rounds over 81mm in size: UNC mortar and artillery units in conjunction with friendly tank fires expended 368, 185 rounds over 81mm in size.

Casualty figures were

15th Infantry Regiment - 68 KIA, 343 WIA, 35 MIA; KATUSA - 8 KIA, 51 WIA, 7 MIA;

Greek Expeditionary Force, Sparta Battalion - 15 KIA, 36 WIA, 1 MIA.

Attached and supporting units 5th RCT - 13 KIA, 67 WIA, 1 MIA;

10th Engineer Battalion - 5 KIA, 23 WIA; 39th FA - 5 KIA, 13 WIA.

For the first time in the annals of U.S. military history, five rifle companies together, four American and one Greek, would receive the prestigious Distinguished Unit Citation for the outstanding performance of their shared mission.

ΑΝΔΡΩΝ ΕΠΙΦΑΝΩΝ ΠΑΣΑ ΓΗ ΤΑΦΟΣ!

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Άγονος ο Τουρκικός διαγωνισμός / Turkey to start oil exploration alone in eastern Med

By Orhan Coskun

ANKARA, Sept 14 (Reuters) - Turkey will start drilling for oil alone next year in part of the eastern Mediterranean near Cyprus and Syria after regional tensions put potential partners off applying for joint exploration licences, Turkish officials said.

International oil companies had shown interest in partnering with Turkey's state-run oil firm TPAO to explore the Iskenderun-Mersin region, tucked in a corner of the eastern Mediterranean near the island of Cyprus and the Syrian shore.

But with the 18-month-old Syrian crisis and Turkey's decades-old dispute over Cyprus showing little sign of abating, none of the 11 firms which showed initial interest ended up applying for a licence, Turkish energy officials said.

"Companies are concerned about stability in the region. Because of this they did not enter into the process that TPAO started. However, when the region calms down, the same interest will be shown again," one of the officials told Reuters. "TPAO will start exploration in 2013. TPAO plans two separate drills in the (Iskenderun) Gulf," he said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Turkey is locked in a row with the internationally-recognised Republic of Cyprus over who has the right to tap hydrocarbon deposits in the eastern Mediterranean.

Surveys suggest more than 100 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of reserves could lie untapped throughout the region, a potential that has sparked investor interest but also revived decades-old boundary disputes.


REGIONAL TENSIONS

Turkey, which shares long land borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran, has also been thrust to the forefront of renewed Middle East tensions and has seen conflicts in neighbouring countries spill into its own territory.

Tens of thousands of Syrian refugees have fled to Turkey, which has also given sanctuary to rebels fighting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's forces. Ankara is also grappling with its own Kurdish insurgency that has produced some of the bloodiest fighting with government forces in over a decade.

Over the past three years, there have been significant discoveries made in the eastern Mediterranean basin. Cyprus reported a natural gas discovery in December and neighbouring Israel has reported two major finds offshore in the sea separating both countries.

But Turkey has challenged Cypriot attempts to discover offshore reserves, while Lebanon is in dispute with Israel over the Jewish state's discoveries.

Adding to tensions, Turkey, the only country to recognise the state of northern Cyprus, started onshore oil and gas explorations on the breakaway state in April.

Turkish officials said in March 11 firms had showed interest in exploring in the Iskenderun-Mersin region: Chevron, Total, Petrobras, Statoil, ConocoPhillips, OMV, RWE, Perenco, Genel Energy, BG and Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Co., or Kufpec.

Last November, TPAO signed an accord with Shell for hydrocarbon exploration and production further west in the Mediterranean off the coast of Antalya and shale gas exploration near the southeastern city of Diyarbakir.

Πηγή Reuters

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Κουρδικό αντάρτικο και τουρκική παραπληροφόρηση

Παραπληροφόρηση : Εικόνες που υποτίθεται απεικονίζουν το S-70 που κατέπεσε στην Daglica στις 22/7/2012

Σε συνέχεια προηγούμενου σημειώματος σχετικά με την πρόσφατη απώλεια τουρκικού S-70 στην περιοχή της Daglica. Γράφαμε χθες πώς "Οι αναφορές αυτές (σ.σ περί χρήσης εκρηκτικού μηχανισμού απο τους Κούρδους) έρχονται να αμφισβητήσουν την εγκυρότητα των πλάνων που δημοσίευσαν τουρκικά ΜΜΕ, τα οποία απεικονίζουν S-70 με εξωτερικές δεξαμενές καυσίμου να έχει πραγματοποιήσει βαριά προσγείωση, σε απόσταση αναπνοής από στρατιωτικό φυλάκιο."

Μια σύντομη έρευνα αποδεικνύει την προχειρότητα με την οποία οι Τουρκικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις και τα ελεγχόμενα από το κράτος ΜΜΕ παραμυθιάζουν την κοινή γνώμη της γείτονος, σερβίροντας μαϊμού ρεπορτάζ που υποβαθμίζουν διαρκώς την δράση του ΡΚΚ. Στα πλαίσια αυτά, θέλοντας να προσδώσουν αξιοπιστία στους ισχυρισμούς του Τουρκικού Γενικού Επιτελείου περί "μηχανικής βλάβης" και να αποσιωπήσουν την Κουρδική ανάμειξη στο περιστατικό της 22/7, τα τουρκικά ΜΜΕ προέβαλαν πλάνα που απεικονίζουν ένα σχεδόν άθικτο ε/π S-70 Blackhawk της Στρατοχωροφυλακής.(1,2,3)

Η πραγματικότητα όμως είναι αρκετά διαφορετική. Τα συγκεκριμένα (ελαφρώς αλλοιωμένα) πλάνα ελήφθησαν πριν από δύο χρόνια (14.5.2010), μετά από περιστατικό βαριάς προσγείωσης τουρκικού S-70 μέσα στην πόλη της Yuksekova και πιο συγκεκριμένα, εντός της έδρας της 21ης Ταξιαρχίας Στρατοχωροφυλακής. Για του λόγου το αληθές, παραθέτουμε και τις σχετικές φωτογραφίες, βίντεο και αναφορές για το συμβάν. Το συγκεκριμένο ελικόπτερο είχε πραγματοποιήσει βαριά προσγείωση λίγο μετά την απογείωση του, μόλις 150 μέτρα μακρυά από το ελικοδρόμιο του στρατοπέδου.

Η πραγματικότητα : Bαριά προσγείωση S-70 εντός του στρατοπέδου της 21ης Ταξιαρχίας στην Yuksekova (14/5/2010)

Όπως αναφέρθηκε στο προηγούμενο σημείωμα, το ε/π της Jandarma πιθανότατα κατέπεσε μετά από πυροδότηση αυτοσχέδιου εκρηκτικού μηχανισμού σε σημειωμένη ζώνη προσγείωσης (1). Αν λάβουμε υπόψιν ότι ορισμένα δημοσιεύματα μιλάνε για αποκόλληση του ουραίου τμήματος του S-70 μετά την έκρηξη, αντιλαμβανόμαστε πλήρως για πιο λόγο εμφανίστηκαν τα σαφώς πιο "εύπεπτα" πλάνα της 14/5/2010..

Translation in English:

Kurdish insurgency and Turkish misinformation

Following our previous post regarding the loss of the Turkish S-70 helicopter in the Daglica area, we wrote that "these reports (re: the use of an explosive device by the Kurds) pose a question mark regarding the authenticity of the published photos and videos used by the Turkish media, which show an S-70 with external fuel tanks having made an emergency landing close to an army post"

A short research reveals the clumsiness of the Turkish authorities and the controlled by them media, intentionally misinform the Turkish and international public opinion, by reporting fake stories that aim to downgrade PKKs military actions. In this context while attempting to validate the Turkish General Staff's press release for the all present "technical malfunction" and to erase Kurdish military action on the incident of the 22nd of July, the Turkish media showed images and video of an almost intact S-70, supposedly belonging to the Jandarma.(1,2,3)

The reality is quite different. These slightly doctored images were taken 2 years ago (12 May 2010) after a heavy landing of an S-70 inside the town of Yuksekova and more specifically inside the camp of the 21st Jandarma Brigade. Here are the links so you can check the videos, photos and stories yourself. This helicopter made an emergency landing about 150 meters from the Jandarma camps helipad.

As we said in our earlier post, Jandarma's helicopter was probably destroyed after an improvised explosive device was fired at the landing zone. If we take into account reports about the breaking of the helicopters tail section after the explosion, we fully understand why these "innocent enough" photos were presented on purpose in order to misinform.

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Found in action

by Dr Constantine Lagos*

During the First World War, Britain’s Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) operated from airbases in the northern Aegean, on the islands of Tenedos, Imvros, Limnos and Thasos. The last was located at Prinos. Between May 1916 and the end of the war, British and Commonwealth pilots used its airfield for combat missions against the Bulgarians who occupied Eastern Macedonia and Thrace from 1916 to 1918 and also the Turks in the Dardanelles.
The Bulgarians and Turks were allied to the Germans and some of their famous (German) Ace pilots were involved in dogfights with British and Greek pilots over the Aegean. One of those British pilots was Flight Lieutenant Warner Hutchins Peberdy, a Canadian who voluntarily joined the RNAS in 1915

Sent on a reconnaissance mission to Eastern Macedonia on 14 January 1917, Peberdy failed to return to Prinos. He was declared missing in action and it was assumed that his aircraft had crashed in the sea and that he did not survive. A twisted part of the aeroplane showing the
force of impact and the explosion that followed

A twisted part of the aeroplane showing the force of impact and the explosion that followed

Rare aviation find
But a discovery in February provides strong evidence that the mystery of his fate may be resolved at long last. At that time, the municipality of Thasos invited members of the Kerykeion team, a non-profit and non-governmental organisation that researches aviation history in Greece, to investigate the veracity of a story circulating for many years now about an aircraft wreckage on one of the island’s mountains, supposedly dating back to the time when the airbase at Prinos was operational. The members of the team, aided by two locals, were able to locate the wreckage close to the peak of Profitis Ilias, a high mountain overlooking Prinos. The wreckage consists of a large number of metallic parts on the surface of the soil while many more appear to be buried in the earth and covered by bushes. What is particularly interesting is that we seem to have located the exact spot of the plane’s impact, a hole in the surface where parts belonging to the airplane’s front are still visible.

Research by members of the Kerykeion team on cases of other aeroplanes that operated from Prinos airbase and crashed as a result of enemy action or accidents do not match the evidence of the aircraft that crashed at Profitis Ilias. Indeed, there is a strong case that this is Peberdy’s plane and that he crashed while trying to land at Thasos, not in the sea. This means that the remains of the pilot may still lie buried among the debris of his aeroplane. However, we can only be certain about this after the full excavation of the aircraft. It is difficult to be certain about the exact version from the parts of the wreckage visible on the surface, but Peberdy flew with a Nieuport 11 single-seater tractor scout plane - a French-built biplane reconnaissance airplane that was used during WWI, by most allied air forces - and the preliminary survey of the wreckage parts show that this, too, was a Nieuport, and probably an 11.

No wooden parts of the airplane seem to have survived, as a major forest fire in 1985 destroyed the entire area where the wreckage is located. The importance of this find affects aviation history globally. This is the very first wreckage from a First World War aircraft to be found in Greece and a very rare find anywhere in the world. However, what makes this discovery even more important is the fact that it may very well solve a 95-year mystery concerning the fate of an RNAS pilot. The municipality of Thasos and the Hellenic Air Force general staff have been informed about this find and it is hoped that an official investigation will be undertaken for the recovery and positive identification of the aircraft and the pilot who flew it.

First Greek casualty

Thasos was the site of multiple battles with the Germans. The British using the Prinos airbase were joined by the pilots of the Hellenic Naval Aviation (Naftiko Aeroporiko Soma) under the leadership of the legendary commander of the Hellenic Navy, Aristides Moraitinis. In a battle on 5 June 1917, a German pilot brought down a Greek airplane off the coast of Thasos, killing its pilot. Ensign Demetrios Argyropoulos became the first Greek airman to be killed in a combat mission. In total, nine Greek airmen serving at the Prinos airbase during the First World War died as a result of enemy action. In February 1919, following the end of the war, the airfield at Prinos was abandoned. Today most of its former site is marshland, with some cultivated fields on its edges.

• Dr Constantine Lagos is a lecturer of Aviation History at the Hellenic Air Force Academy and a member of the Kerykeion team that identified the First World War wreckage on Thasos

Πηγή

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Hellenic CL-415 Canadairs fighting big forest fire in Israel

Four HAF CL-415 Canadair water bombers reached Israel at dawn today and are already taking part in the effort to suppress the wildfire burning in the area of Haifa. The four aircraft, belonging to 383 Squadron of 113th Fighter Wing, took off from Thessaloniki last night, accompanied by a C-130 carrying support personnel and additional crews; they were refueled at Larnaca (Cyprus) and reached Israel at dawn.

An HAF CL-415 seen early today, landing at Ramat David AFB in northern Israel

The 4 Hellenic CL-415s

Apart from its obvious humanitarian character, there is also significant diplomatic value to this mission, since the Hellenic aircraft that rushed during the night were among the very first of foreign assistance to reach Israel.




Congratulations are in order for the Hellenic Air Force, which managed to organize a demanding night mission into an unknown area on a very short notice, despite the fact that winter months are considered "off-season" for firefighting units, thus projecting Greece's positive image to the world. The HAF's Canadair crews have over the years accumulated a vast experience suppressing forest fires in Greece, which is expected to be an important asset in the fight against the wildfire in Israel.

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The Shooting Down of the Turkish F-102s

By Demetrius Stergiou

In our attempt to get out of the ordinary discussions, we decided to do a small photographic dedication, accompanied by a narrative of an incident that in our opinion is the most important contribution of the F-5 in the modern history of the EPA. This decision fell after dozens of phone-calls and requests by Cockpit readers. And for those that haven't understood yet, or do not know, let us clear that we are talking about the shooting down of a Turkish F-102 by a Greek F-5 on July 21 1974, and the destruction of a second one. The incident which resulted in two Turkish pilots loosing their lives was recalled by one of the two Greek protagonists, then young Pilot Officer and today retired Brigadier General Thomas Skamparthonis.

"...I reported to the Icarus School (Greek Air Force Academy) in October of 1968 and joined the 44th Training Class. The 44th was the first that completed four years in the Academy, since up to that time the years for graduating were three, as was the same in the Army and Navy Academies. The Icari (cadet pilots) of the 43rd Class, been in the transition stage from three to four years, were sworn as Pilot Officers at 3 1/2 years and we were the first to be commissioned at 4 years. So I was sworn in as a Pilot Officer in September of 1972.

The years at the Academy passed relatively fast. In the first year the basic training was conducted, and this included 35 hours on T-6 Texans and Harvards. We soloed at 25 hours, which is considered late by today's standards, as this was attributed the T-6 being pretty difficult for the young cadets. From the next year (1969-1970) things for the cadets at Icarus School changed with the of the T-41D Mescaleros of the 360 MAE (Mira Arhikis Ekpedefsis, Basic Training Squadron). My class, the 44th, was the last to train with the Harvards.

In the second year we continued our training with the T-37. At that time we didn't go to Kalamata for this, but to Elefsis. There, the 361 EMA using the T-37 and the 362 EMA using the T-33A for advanced training were stationed, as wells as the 355MTM. In the second year we concluded our basic training, logging some 70-75 hours, while at the third year, in the advanced stage, we logged 120 hours in the T-33.

Of course at the time my Class was at the advanced stage, Kalamata opened (1970-71), so most T-33 hours were logged there. This change however was not the last for my class. When we reached our fourth year at the Academy, the EPA leadership decided that the Icari should pass another stage of training, called the "operational" and this provided for the conversion on the F-84F and for us to trained in air-to-ground weapons tactics only. We were to use all weapons that the F-84F was capable of using and fire these. At some point the EPA leadership finally decided that this was "risky" – despite our significant flying experience gathered the previous three years, so we logged at Larissa the amount of hours necessary (50-60) using the T-33 again. These were Canadian-built MkIII's, and were used because of their greater weapon carrying capability.

I was sworn in as Pilot Officer in September of 1972 and was transferred to 111 PM (Fighter Wing) at Nea Anchialos. At that time the F-5 was used as an unofficial lead-in-fighter training aircraft (“LIFT”) for newly commissioned pilots that would then transfer to other aircraft, foremost F-104Gs and F-84Fs (the F-104G-units also had two-seaters). I was appointed to 337MAH – a Day Interceptor Squadron, as was the title and the main task of the unit at the time. We had a secondary fighter-bomber role. The operational conversion training for me along with other four of my classmates that were transferred together with me, started immediately, with ground school for the aircraft systems (it was named KEM) and the classes of flight theory, and by the late 1972/early 1973 we started flying the F-5, going solo after seven hours – if I remember correctly.

Young Flt.Lt. Thomas Scampardonis seen in front of an EPA F-5A, in the 1970s. (T. Skampardonis' private collection, via Nicholas Tselepidis)

After 50 hours flown over a span of four to five month, I was declared operational and took part in all the Squadron’s activities. This happened in early summer of 1973. Time passed quickly as that year was full of events, but I have to say that absolutely nothing warned us of what was about to follow in the summer of 1974. Our relations with Turkey seemed – and probably were – quite good. No reason for scrambles, interceptions and things like that. Of course as a fighter squadron we always had readiness, but, as far as I can remember in the one year I was operational in the squadron, we did not do one single interception of Turkish aircraft. Significantly, only four months before the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, in April of 1974, we visited the THK air base of Bandirma in a squadron-exchange program within the NATO. We remained there for ten days, returning the visit made to us by the Turkish F-5s a few months back. I repeat that nothing – but really nothing – was indicative of what was about to follow in July and August of 1974.

Flt. Lt. Skampardonis (seen to left) together with a colleague from the 111PM at Nea Anchialos (T. Skampardonis' private collection, via Nicholas Tselepidis)

Even as of July of 1974, with all that happened in Cyprus, we didn't have readiness or alerts, at least not in the Air Force. This I know because the day of the Turkish invasion I was on leave. That morning I went to the balcony to drink my morning coffee when a neighbor informed me that a general mobilization was ordered. Without believing her I opened the television and got the first glimpse of the situation. I packed my things, said “goodbye” to my wife and took my car to the road for Anchialos. This took me many more hours than usual since many parts of the Athens-Lamia freeway were closed, so when I finally arrived at my base it was late in the afternoon.

I was ordered to get into my anti-G suit and done the life-west, and head for the shelter that was assigned to me after a short briefing. The last hours of July 20th (**) passed quietly and from what I am in a position to know there were not any Turkish violations over the Aegean the whole day long.

The next day, however, things would change. From early morning we had massive violations of the Athens F.I.R. by Turkish aircraft. Me and my colleagues were all inside our aircrafts and waited. Our readiness were of five and two minutes, so we were sitting inside the F-5 cockpit with seatbelts on, waiting for the order to scramble. About 1:30 in the afternoon, a scramble was sounded and to my surprise, I was in the first pair to take off. My leader was Flt. Lt. Dinopoulos, senior than me in the squadron, serving as an instructor. Without having time to think I started both engines, went out of the shelter, and waited a while to be called by my No.1. This did not happen so I went on the frequency calling my No.1. I haven’t got any answer so I taxied on the taxiway waiting for Dinopoulos to lead me to the holding point.

When he came to the connection point I was in, with a series of hand-signals he explained that he had no radio and could neither transmit nor receive anything. With another signal he told me to lead as No.1 and he would follow watching my moves and covering me as a wingman. Flt. Lt. Dinopoulos should have aborted and return to his shelter actually. This was what our orders provided for in such cases. He didn't do it however and preferred to take-off without me ever knowing the reason for such a decision. I estimate, without being certain, that weighing the situation he followed the unwritten rule that in times of crisis, even with a malfunction, aircraft always take off one way or another. It was certainly a gutsy decision that showed his level of training and professionalism. I went ahead and did exactly what I used to do in training or regular flights without being anxious about anything.

According to Themis Vranas from the Greek magazine Pitsi, the first of the two F-5As claimed to have been involved in the incident on 22nd July is the 66-9137, seen here wearing a red line on the fin. (Ptisi & Themis Vranas, via Nicholas Tselepidis)

In our briefings we were specifically ordered to have our weapons switches in the Off position and to do nothing more than a visual ID of the bogeys we would meet. We had no briefing that would indicate that we should be ready for all instances. Of course our unit (111PM) was combat ready with all anti-aircraft guns armed, manned and in position, high security measures etc. So before we took off I knew we would fly a typical interception, a procedure done many timed before in peacetime.

I followed the instructions of the Mt Pelion Radar station (call-sign “Joker”) and we started climbing heading for the North Aegean. Dinopoulos followed from a relative long distance flying always higher than me (I don't know exactly how much) in order to be able to watch my movements and the surrounding area. I always followed Joker's instructions that constantly changed my heading and altitude.

You see, our "targets" were many that day. After two or three such changes of level and heading I was ordered by Joker to head for the area between the islands of Aghios Efstratios and Limnos at a lever of 20.000ft. While I was still climbing to about 18.000ft with a 350 knots speed, I was warned by Joker to look for bogeys at 20 degrees right. I turned my attention to that area and almost immediately I saw two Turkish F-102s flying in a tight formation to my left, on a distance no greater than 200 meters. Instinctively and without any delay I stopped climbing, broke hard left and started turning to get behind them. Almost immediately I realized they were doing the same, since I had always visual contact seeing them at my left (8 o'clock). I reported to Joker – and to tell you the truth, when I saw them turning behind me I thought they were going to head back east to their base. This, however, did not happen!

They continued turning in order to get at my 'six and this was evident now. I had full throttle and was on maximum turn rate trying to keep visual contact. In this effort my speed dropped to 300 knots so I gradually started lowering my nose since we met at the same level but they were in a better position, because they were flying level while I broke my climb.

After at least four such turns I reported to Joker that I was engaged and continued turning while descending. At a certain point I lost visual contact but I continued turning and looking out my canopy in order to regain visual. Now I was flying at less than 10.000ft and as I was looking in all directions I saw at the rather wavy sea water tower climbing very high and then turning in a big oil spill. Then I realised what happened and turned my attention to Dinopoulos trying to locate him. I asked Joker where he was but got back no specific answer.

The other F-5A involved should have been the 38414, repainted in "Aegean Blue" sheme during the 1980s, and photographed in 1984, in Italy, while on a squadron exchange. According to other sources, the other F-5A from the engagements with THK F-102As was 63-8414, however. (Capt. Nikos Karatzides, via Nicholas Tselepidis)

I was ordered to return to Anchialos and a few moments later I was given a vector for a new bogey that was heading also west like me. I followed Joker's instructions but was unable to find him. Visibility was not that good that day. When I landed, Dinopoulos' aircraft passed over the runway. I stopped at the end of the runway and waited for him to join me. I was surprised to see that both his wingtip Sidewinders were missing. Stoping our aircraft at the apron we got out – and before we could say anything to each other we were surrounded by colleagues and technicians asking all kinds of questions. Almost immediately a jeep came and took us away from this pandemonium. We were both questioned separately and returned to our duties. After a while I found out what had happened.

Dinopoulos was following from a distance and being higher was not seen by the two Turkish pilots. He watched all the engagement descending and closing. Before he could do anything he saw the bay of the leader F-102 open and an AIM-4 Phalcon been fired at me. The missile missed since we were both in a tight sustained turn so they were out of parameters. Without been noticed Dinopoulos closed in range. Let me add here that the target was clearly identified visually. As you know the F-5A had no radar. When you had a visual on the target, you turned the weapons switch on, in the “ARM” position, selecting guns or missiles. At that time we had only the early AIM-9Bs on our F-5A. A lock-on on the target was achieved when – after selecting the missile, and after its seeker head was warmed up and establishing a contact with the hot exhaust gas of the target – you heard a screeching sound that was sharper as the seeker head was turning closer to the target. Then you were ready to fire. Distance was calculated visualy also through the gunsight. For example, when the surface of the target was covering all the gunsight, you were 1200 meters away; if the surface was covering half the gunsight, distance was also half etc. If I remember correctly the optimal distance for the AIM-9B was about 800 meters. Having these parameters, Dinopoulos turned the weapon switch “ON” and fired immediately one Sidewinder.

The missile was, however, was not ready yet and – lacking the time to "warm-up" - missed. The second Sidewinder in the meantime was ready to fire and gave a loud sound signal. Dinopoulos fired the second missile without hesitation. The missile hit dead-center and he had to brake hard right in order to avoid being hit by the debris of the F-102 that was burning while crashing into the sea.

THK F-102A Delta Dagger seen in the 1970s, and looking the same as the two examples engaged by the Greek fighters on 22nd July 1974. (Tom Cooper collection)

The same night we learned that in Turkish television it was reported that two Turkish fighters had shot down two Greek ones. The Greek side did not announce (and did not confirm or deny) anything. Long time after that we learned that the second Turkish pilot (we do not know if he was the No.1 or No.2 of their formation) lost his direction probably due to shock. He was panicked, thought that we were on his tail and made extensive and unnecessary use of his afterburner, thus going “bingo fuel” and finally crash-landing on a highway. His aircraft was destroyed and he died of his injuries later at the hospital.

We also learned that the Turkish pilots were probably high ranking ones and we got word that the leader was a Lieutenant Colonel, and his wingman a Major. After this, nothing happened: there were no news. We returned to normal pace and the Turks did not show up over the Aegean even at the second phase of the Cyprus invasion in August 1974. What changed that day was that from now on Greek fighters always took off with the weapons switches in the “ON” position and that the Turks did not show up over the Aegean for years. And when I say years, I mean years. From what I am in a position to know, their first hesitant attempts to fly over the area were done in 1976-77.

Many years later I was serving in Naples, at “Air-South” Command, when a Turkish pilot approached me and we started to talk. When he stared to tell me about the capabilities of his country's Air Force, he mentioned that the Turkish F-102's shot down two Greek F-5's. When I asked him if I look like a zombie he changed colour. I have never seen a more embarrassed man in my life..."

Brig. Gen. Thomas Skampardonis describing the head-on pass during the engagement with two THK F-102As while bieng interviewed by Demetrius Stergiou. (Savvas Vlassis, via Nicholas Tselepidis)

Even if some say that the Greek pilots involved in this incident were mistreated by PA General Staff, and were not given the proper promotions, Thomas Skamparthonis denied this strongly. He did not deny however that both he and Dinopoulos were not given any medal or commendation for their combat. From our point of view we believe that not going public and recognizing this incident is not the right way, especially since the Turkish side still claims - foremost through the internet – that their F-102s shot down the Greek F-5's!

That the "other side" has always maintained an affection for propaganda and winning the last impression, is well known, even if some Greeks in key positions cannot or are not willing to understand it. It is almost certain that the same tactic will be continued in the future. Is it not time for PA to end its silence and state the facts? Twenty seven years have passed and we believe this should be done soon!


Note

The AIM-4 carried by the Turkish F-102's were probably of the -D version, fielded in 1963 for use against fighter aircraft. However, we can only be sure that the missile was practically useless in air combat within the visual distances, especially under the specific conditions that the Turkish pilot used it in: sustained turn at maximum degrees and high G's. It is certain that despite the improvements of this version, kinetically it was almost the same missile as the -C version, intended for use against the Soviet bombers, not in manoeuvring combat against enemy fighters.

(*) Ikarus is the name of the cadet in theHellenic Air Force Academy, the "Sholi Ikaron"

(**) The date has been confirmed now as the 22nd by numerous other PA pilots who were in the air that day, especially 339 Mira F-4E pilots, Air Vice Marshalls (Ret.):
- Panagiotis Mpalles
- Stephen Skrekas,
- George Skarlatos
- Panagiotis Manousos,
- Member of Parliament, Ministerof Defence and Colonel (Ret.) Spilios Spiliotopoulos.

Also we have the report by the then Colonel P. Semertzakis who studied all official PA reports during the invasion of Cyprus and was submitted in December 1974 to the PA General Staff, and which analysed all aspects of the aerial operations.

The Greek MoD George Averoff, member of the civilian Government that lead the Country to free democratic elections in the fall of 1974, during his meeting with State Departments Undersecretary of State Hartman, also mentioned the 22nd July as the date of this engagement.

www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_298.shtml

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